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Abstract: Dominant accounts of “speaker meaning” in post-Gricean contextual-
ist pragmatics tend to focus on single utterances, making the theoretical
assumption that the object of pragmatic analysis is restricted to cases where
speakers and hearers agree on utterance meanings, leaving instances of mis-
understandings out of their scope. However, we know that divergences in
understandings between interlocutors do often arise, and that when they do,
speakers can engage in a local process of meaning negotiation. In this paper, we
take insights from interactional pragmatics to offer an empirically informed view
on speaker meaning that incorporates both speakers’ and hearers’ perspectives,
alongside a formalization of how to model speaker meanings in such a way that
we can account for both understandings – the canonical cases – and misunder-
standings, but critically, also the process of interactionally negotiating meanings
between interlocutors. We highlight that utterance-level theories of meaning
provide only a partial representation of speaker meaning as it is understood in
interaction, and show that inferences about a given utterance at any given time
are formally connected to prior and future inferences of participants. Our pro-
posed model thus provides a more fine-grained account of how speakers con-
verge on speaker meanings in real time, showing how such meanings are often
subject to a joint endeavor of complex inferential work.
Keywords: speaker meaning, interactional achievement, conversational inference,
semantic contextualism, miscommunication, negotiation of meaning
…meaning lies not with the speaker nor the addressee nor the utterance alone as many
philosophical arguments have considered, but rather with the interactional past, current,
and projected next moment. The meaning of an entire utterance is a complex, not well
understood, algorithm of these emergent, non-linear, sense-making interactions (Schegloff
et al. 1996: 181).
*Corresponding author: Chi-Hé Elder, University of East Anglia, Language and Communication
Studies, Norwich, UK, E-mail: c.elder@uea.ac.uk
Michael Haugh, University of Queensland, School of Languages and Cultures, Brisbane, Australia,
E-mail: michael.haugh@uq.edu.au
Intercultural Pragmatics 2018; 15(5): 593–625
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/18/19 1:48 AM
1 Introduction
Since Grice’s (1957, 1975) seminal writings, the notion of “speaker meaning” has
become a familiar concept in formal pragmatics. It provides a level of theoriza-
tion that goes beyond the literal content of what is said by individual utterances,
comprising the variety of implicit meanings that speakers communicate.
However, what constitutes speaker meaning is not uniformly agreed, and can
vary depending on one’s theoretical commitments (Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012;
Kecskes 2010). For example, a speaker-centric view on meaning might take
speaker meaning to refer to (i) the meaning (or range of meanings) a speaker
intends to communicate, while a hearer-oriented view might consider speaker
meaning as (ii) the meaning which the speaker is presumed to have intended to
communicate, or even (iii) * the meaning which the speaker is taken to have
communicated, regardless of whether he/she intended it.
In this paper we aim to combine these options in a way that can accom-
modate both speaker and hearer perspectives on the meanings of individual
utterances (cf. Kecskes 2010, Kecskes 2017; Sanders 1987, Sanders 2015). This
aim is motivated by the facts that speakers and hearers sometimes need to
negotiate meanings when divergences arise, and moreover, that the process of
negotiation is a typical occurrence in everyday communication (see, e.g. Bilmes
1986; Haugh 2008a; Kecskes 2008; Sanders 2015). This is partly due to the
fact that speaker meaning is not simply a theoretical construct grounded in
(a presumed) cognitive reality, but a deontological one with real-world conse-
quences for speakers (Haugh 2013; Sanders 1987). The stakes may vary, but
speakers clearly have a vested interest in being understood as they intend
themselves to be understood (Kecskes 2013).1 We thus take “speaker meaning”
to be (iv) the meaning that is “interactionally achieved” between participants
(cf. Schegloff 1981), and our aim in this paper is to propose a model of this
speaker meaning in such a way that accounts for both straightforward under-
standings – the canonical cases – and misunderstandings through the process
of interactionally negotiating meanings between interlocutors.2
1 Indeed, the negotiation of speaker meaning even extends to “strategic misunderstandings” as
Robles (2017) has recently demonstrated.
2 We acknowledge that meaning negotiation is traditionally associated with troubles in under-
standing in L1–L2 interactions (see e.g. Long 1983; Varonis and Gass 1985) and has been
extensively discussed in applied linguistics (e.g. Chiang 2009; Foster and Ohta 2005; Pica
1994). However, in this paper we are referring to meaning negotiation in the ethnomethodolo-
gical sense (e.g. Garfinkel 1967; Heritage 1984), that is, the interactional processes by which
participants (actively) shape or “interactionally achieve” what speakers are accountably taken
594 C.-H. Elder and M. Haugh
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/18/19 1:48 AM
Taking the object of speaker meaning as that which is interactionally
achieved runs counter to dominant contextualist accounts of speaker meaning
in philosophical pragmatics (e.g. Recanati 2010; Sperber and Wilson 1995) that
provide analyses of individual utterances as they arise in conversation. On such
views, speaker meaning is conceptualized as the output of a speaker’s language
processing system and as the input of the language processing system of
another person. While such views on meaning have their place in pragmatic
theory, our aim is to capture both speaker and hearer perspectives in a single
notion of speaker meaning. As pointed out by Arundale (2008), this necessarily
involves accounting for non-summative meanings,3 in the sense that inferences
that interlocutors make about meanings are formally interdependent with the
responses of others. As such, our notion of speaker meaning is informed not
only by the speaker’s inference about how he/she will be understood, but also
the inference that is made available by a hearer’s response about how he/she
has understood that prior utterance, which in turn gives rise to further infer-
ences of the speaker regarding the meaning of his/her own utterance with
respect to how it has been understood. This takes us away from a view on
speaker meaning that is informed solely by the utterance as it arises in context,
but towards what has been termed the three-part architecture of conversational
inference that underpins meaning (cf. Arundale 1999). So, against dominant
contextualist solutions in the post-Gricean literature, our model highlights that
utterance-level theories of meaning provide only a partial representation of
speaker meaning as it is understood in interaction, and in this sense, our view
is closer in spirit to theories of discourse structure, such as Question Under
Discussion (e.g. Ginzburg 2012) and Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
(Asher and Lascarides 2003).
Note that while the term “speaker meaning” can be used to incorporate a
variety of meanings, ranging from strong to weak and from explicit to implicit,
in this paper we do not attempt to model social inferences such as politeness
effects, or weak implicatures (cf. Sperber and Wilson 2015). Rather, the meaning
that we aim to model here is the most salient propositional meaning that is
ostensively made operative between interlocutors. Note that, as will become
clear, we depart from the standard Gricean distinction between “what is said”
and “what is meant”, and instead take a view on speaker meaning that is more
closely related to Jaszczolt’s (2005, 2016) “primary meaning” – namely, the main
to mean in both L1–L2 (e.g. Kecskes et al. 2018) and L1–L1 interactions (e.g. Sanders 2017)
through their responses to prior utterances.
3 Arundale (Forthcoming) has subsequently used the term “non-additive” to refer these kinds
of emergent meanings as the latter term is more widely used in the scientific literature.
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intended meaning of a speaker which is successfully recovered by a hearer – or
Ariel’s (2002) “privileged interactional interpretation”, the speaker’s most rele-
vant contribution to the discourse.4 However, while these semantic contextualist
solutions have gone some way towards offering a semantics of natural language
utterances that converges with cognitive reality, what our model adds to these
extant proposals of propositional meaning is a more fine-grained account of how
speakers converge on the most salient proposition in real time that allows for
divergences in understanding between interlocutors.
To exemplify the model, we focus on the phenomenon of hinting, specifically,
requestive hints. Requestive hinting encompasses a particular pragmatic move in
which a speaker communicates an “off-record indirect request” (Brown and
Levinson 1987) such that the hearer is expected to figure out the speaker’s
intention, and so squarely fall under Jary’s (2013) category of “behavioral impli-
catures”.5 Typical analyses of hinting tend to focus on a single utterance that
contains the hint (e.g. “this soup’s a bit bland”, “it’s a bit cold in here”) where the
intended meaning is relatively determinate and the implicature is readily avail-
able. However, requestive hints are not always so straightforwardly recoverable,
and can vary in their “propositional opacity” (Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984;
Weizman 1985). Exactly because requestive hints are formulated in such a way
that the content of the request is not overtly attended to, the speaker’s commu-
nicative intention is presented as deliberately ambiguous and the speaker retains
plausible deniability that he/she actually requested anything. Due to this ambi-
guity or even absence of an intention to request, a single-utterance analysis is
likely to run into trouble when determining the “meaning” of the hinting utter-
ance (Ogiermann 2015). Examining instances of “hinting” thus provide a fruitful
testing ground for teasing out the propositions at play in such interactions.
4 As Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012) point out, intention can be understood and used in multiple
different ways in modelling speaker meaning. In the subsequent discussion, we are referring to
“intention” in its ordinary, discursive sense as what speakers and hearers are licensed to infer
as the main “intended” meaning of a speaker. In that sense, we are sympathetic to the
Relevance Theoretic position that propositional meaning is ultimately determined by the
hearer’s uptake (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1995). Claims about the actual intentions of speakers
or inferences about those intentions necessarily require different methodological warrants, but
these go beyond the scope of the theoretical claims in this paper. We would simply note here
that to locate speaker meaning in the inferences of the hearer, alongside those of the speaker, is
to commit to a public notion of speaker meaning (Sanders 2013, 2015) involving a set of
available inferences to which the speaker is publicly committed through what he/she says
(and doesn’t say) at that point in time.
5 Notably, hints are regarded by Searle (1979: ix) as falling outside of the formal purview of
speech act theory, but do fall within Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature,
although they were only addressed in passing (see Grice 1987: 368).
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In this paper, we first provide an overview of the literature on requestive
hints, exemplifying the restrictions of a single-utterance account of speaker
meaning with respect to how they are understood. In Section 3, we move to
propose a formal model of the process of negotiating propositional meanings as
non-additive interactional achievements, before showing, in Section 4, how the
model can be applied to interactional data where offers are (more or less
straightforwardly) prompted by what are taken to be hints. Specifically, we
apply the model to a relatively simple case of negotiating meanings through
the three-part architecture, to a more complex example that requires more than
three turns to settle on the operative meaning, and a case in which meanings
can be left more or less indeterminate between interlocutors. We conclude, in
Section 5, by acknowledging that the three-part process of conversational infer-
ence can, of course, be short-circuited, and that two turns is very often sufficient
for speakers and hearers to presume mutual understanding of attested speaker
meaning. We thus provide some reconciliation between our proposal and extant
accounts of “speaker meaning” by situating single-utterance analyses of mean-
ing within this three-part architecture.
2 The propositional meaning of hints
Following Brown and Levinson (1987), an “off-record” speech act is one that uses
indirect language, that is, where the speaker means something through saying
something else (Bach 2006; Davis 1998), thereby decreasing the potential for the
speaker to be seen as imposing on the hearer. On a standard Gricean view of the
division of labor between semantics and pragmatics, the explicitly uttered sen-
tence is taken as the input to semantic – propositional – content, while the
implicitly communicated off-record content pertains to the realm of pragmatics
as a speaker-intended implicature (Grice 1975). On this view, speaker meaning is a
purely pragmatic concern that lies outside the scope of semantic theory. However,
against this Gricean, “minimalist” conception of semantics is the post-Gricean
view of semantic “contextualism”, which aims at delivering a view on “what is
said” that aligns with what the interlocutors themselves agree has been “said”,
thus extending the degree to which pragmatic inferencing is allowed to intrude on
semantic, propositional content.
Phenomena such as reference assignment, conceptual transfer, and so forth,
has provided motivation for appealing to speakers’ intentions to enrich the
logical form of uttered sentences, in essence moving the study of propositional
meaning away from form-based accounts and towards the study of a more
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intuition-motivated “truth-conditional pragmatics” (e.g. Recanati 2010). On such
a view, the propositional content will often be an enriched or modulated logical
form, so that the sentence simply provides the input on which pragmatic
processing can operate. However, as extensively noted by Jaszczolt (e.g. 2005,
2016), sometimes the strongest and most reliable way to communicate thoughts
is by using indirect language. On this view, the primary meaning that is intended
by a speaker is the one that is of most use to interlocutors, even if it drastically
departs from the logical form of the utterance. So, despite the fact that off-record
speech acts typically require hearers to make recourse to pragmatic inferencing
to figure out the speaker’s intended meaning, as long as the hearer can success-
fully recover that meaning, the implicitly communicated, indirect meaning can
take on the status of the most salient propositional meaning that is available to
both speaker and hearer.
The following exchange exemplifies that the speaker’s main message may
pertain to an implicitly communicated message, and that the explicit content
need never be attended to, or at least can remain backgrounded.
(1) (Chad is standing in the hallway, holding his 15-month old son’s hand.)
1 C: Hey, Debbie.
2 Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
3 D: Yeah. I think so.
4 You want me to watch him?
5 C: Yeah.
6 D: I’d love to. It’d be a pleasure.
7 C: Okay. Thanks. I’ll bring him around then.
(Jacobs and Jackson 1983: 299)
In line 2, Chad asks Debbie whether she is going to be free at a specific time
later that afternoon. The standard Gricean analysis of the speaker meaning of
this utterance would be that the literal, semantic content pertains to a question –
which is answered by Debbie in line 3 – but that the intended implicated
(pragmatic) meaning can be calculated by considering the relevance of the
question to the interaction. In this sense, Chad’s question can be viewed as an
off-record request for Debbie to watch his son, without directly having to ask. An
analysis of a more contextualist flavor would go a step further to argue that in
order to view Chad’s question as an off-record request with a specific goal in
mind, the question itself requires enriching so as to address the question “free
for what?” (cf. Bach 1994). It may well be the case that Debbie is willing to make
herself free to watch Chad’s son, but may respond differently if the supposed
motivation for the question is for some other purpose, for instance, proposing
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that they have a meeting about a joint research paper at that time.6 That is, it is
through considering the reason for Chad’s question, and hence modulating the
inherently vague word “free”, that Debbie can devise her response. On this view,
a successful interaction is dependent on Debbie reconstructing an enriched
logical form, and it is that enriched meaning that would take on the status of
semantic, propositional content.
There are arguments either way for whether semantics should be more
concerned with the study of explicitly or implicitly communicated thoughts.
We opt out of this debate by instead proposing a third option which we find
the most intuitively plausible, but also the most empirically sound. Rather than
hypothesizing about speakers’ private, cognitive inferences, we aim to represent
speakers’ “primary meanings” that are made available through their on-record
inferences. That is, rather than taking a strict semantic view and representing the
“literal” content of the words uttered, or a pragmatic view that hypothesizes
about speakers’ intended meanings, we aim to represent the primary meanings
that the interlocutors themselves interactionally achieve in the process of com-
munication. A strong motivation for such a view is that, for example in (1), it is
difficult to state with complete certainty the extent to which Chad had an a priori
intention to ask for assistance in line 2, and hence to attribute to Chad such an
intention is potentially cognitively inaccurate. Rather, we are concerned with the
meanings that speakers jointly converge on: the inquiry by Chad in line 2
prompts the offer of assistance from Debbie in line 4, which is readily accepted
by Chad in line 5 (Haugh 2017b: 198). Note that in straightforwardly accepting
Debbie’s offer, Chad does license the inference that he may well have had such
an intention at the time of his initial utterance. However, it also has to be noted
that this intention remains off-record up until that point. In short, it is not clear
that Chad’s utterance in line 2 can be taken as meaning that he wants Debbie to
look after his son in his asking whether Debbie is free at that time, although it is
clearly inferable.
The potential equivocality of speaker intentions underlying questions that
subsequently prompt offers can be seen more clearly in the following example.
(2) (Sirl and Michael, who is staying at Sirl’s place, have both stopped outside
the bathroom at the same time.)
1 S: What time are you leaving this morning?
2 M: Oh, in about an hour I suppose.
3 Are you in a hurry to leave?
4 S: No, no. Just asking.
6 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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5 (2.0)
6 M: Would you like to use the bathroom first?
7 S: Yeah, sure, if you don’t mind.
(Haugh 2007: 94)
In asking whether Sirl is “in a hurry” in line 3, Michael appears to have
inferred from Sirl’s question in line 1 that Sirl would like to use the bathroom
first. Despite the fact that Sirl denies having any such intention in line 4, he
subsequently does not move and continues to stand outside the bathroom
door. Michael then redoes his response to Sirl’s initial question in line 6 by
making an offer, which Sirl then accepts. In this example we can see Sirl
actively working to avoid the inference that, in asking what time Michael is
leaving in line 1, he intends to communicate that he wants Michael to let him
use the bathroom first. But the point is not that Michael misunderstands Sirl’s
intended meaning, but that Sirl responds in such a way as to avoid being
accountable for making a request in the first place. This is possible because it
remains equivocal in such cases whether a proposition that the speaker would
like the hearer to do something for him/her can be attributed to these sorts of
“preliminary” questions (i.e. that are inferable as addressing felicity conditions
for a request) with any certainty.
Analyses of hints in the literature on implicature have tended to overlook
the crucial second and third turns which provide insights into how hints are
attended to by participants. Specifically, in cases where a hint by speaker A does
prompt an offer from speaker B, the way in which A responds to the offer in the
third turn indicates whether A wishes to license the inference that this was
indeed what he/she intended. In fact, Haugh (2017b) suggests that the raison
d’être of hinting is that the third turn gives A an out: A is unlikely to straight-
forwardly accept such an offer from B, as doing so would likely expose A’s
intentions too clearly in a way that is socially dispreferred; instead, A will
frequently hedge their acceptance, provide accounts for accepting, or even
initially reject the offer in order to retain some degree of plausible deniability
with respect to having had any such a priori intention.
The way in which not straightforwardly accepting an offer resists the infer-
ence that the speaker was hinting in the first place is apparent in the following
example.7
7 For the sake of expediency, the original transcription of this interaction has been simplified,
although the use of square brackets has been retained here to indicate overlapping talk. See
(Haugh 2017a: 195) for a more detailed transcription and analysis of this example.
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(3) (Emma has been talking about needing to go out and buy some food as she
doesn’t have anything for dinner)
1 E: I had a little tiny bit-
2 piece a fish so I don’t know I may have to go to the
3 store but you go ahead Gladys and phone it up
4 I think maybe
5 G: they’ll send it down
6 E: ye[ah
7 G: [can I add anything for you?
8 E: Oh honey thanks I think I’ll ah let Guy go
9 G: [Yes
10 E: [Maybe get some fish.
11 G: Okay.
(Haugh 2017b: 195)
In this case, Emma initially refuses, in line 8, the offer from Gladys (line 7)
following Emma’s “thinking aloud”, in lines 2–3, that she’ll need to go up to the
shops (notably, Gladys is aware from previous conversations that Emma doesn’t
like to drive). However, Emma subsequently accepts the offer, albeit in a hedged
manner (line 10). In this way, Emma resists the inference that she intended
Gladys to make such an offer as a result of her previous talk, despite it being
inferable. Relying on utterance-based analyses of hints is evidently not enough
if we are to tap into the processes by which the meanings of such hints are
negotiated.
These kinds of examples also flesh out, at least in part, Sperber and Wilson’s
(2015) broader argument that there are a range of speaker meanings that a
hearer can pick up on from a given utterance. That is, their observation that
one utterance (or act of communication) expresses an array of propositions –
which range in how determinately the content can be uniquely paraphrased into
a natural language sentence and the extent to which the speaker can be held to
be committed to that proposition – underpins their claim that an adequate
theory of communication has to go beyond Grice’s notion of speaker meaning.
In the remainder of this paper, we attempt to extend this broader aim by
pursuing a formal generalization of the process of negotiation between speaker
and hearer in attaining speaker meaning(s) that arise through “hinting” in
conversation. Our aim is not only to show that the meanings of hints are
typically negotiated between interlocutors, but also what that process involves
and how it occurs.
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3 Toward a formalization of the three-part
architecture of conversational inference
Since Grice, there has been a growing debate on what constitutes “what is said”
vis-à-vis “what is implicated” via individual utterances. However, rather than
assuming a one-stage process of “speaker implicates, hearer infers” (Horn 2004)
of single utterances, or even a two-stage process commonly referenced in conversa-
tion analytic studies of “adjacency pairs” (Schegloff and Sacks 1973), we aim to
show that propositions are often subject to a three-part process in which the
previous “one-stage” process is only the first part. A second part occurs when a
hearer responds to a speaker’s utterance (u1) with an utterance of their own (u2),
thereby making publicly available - via inference - his/her inference about the
speaker’s previous utterance, u1. Then, a third part occurs by the speaker further
responding to the hearer’s u2 with another utterance u3, in which the speaker
confirms or disconfirms the hearer’s (displayed) inference as appropriate.
The process of negotiating meanings in this incremental, sequentially-
grounded way has been termed the process of “interactional achievement”
(Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff 1981). In this section we propose a model of inter-
actional achievement in which speaker meaning is formally defined in terms of
the process of negotiating meanings between interlocutors.8 In order to postu-
late a formal model of the conversational inferences that underpin the interac-
tional achievement of “speaker meaning”, we draw on the beginnings of a
formal model of conversational inferencing found in Arundale (2013) on “con-
ceptualizing interaction” in which he distinguishes between “provisional” and
“operative” inferences. Arundale’s proposal draws, in turn, from Krippendorff
(1970), who initially modelled this kind of interaction effect in more formal terms
with respect to different types of communication data. The notion of “speaker
meaning” we are focusing on here is thus a deontological one, that is, the
propositional meanings of utterances in the first turn to which speakers are
held accountable through the responses of hearers in the second turn, and held
reflexively accountable through responding themselves in the third turn (to the
hearer’s response in the second turn to their initial utterance in the first turn)
(Haugh 2013: 47).
8 Arundale (Forthcoming) makes a distinction between two-part interactional achievement (or
what he terms autonomous co-constituting) and three-part conjoint co-constituting in his
conjoint co-constituting model of communication. Given our focus is more specifically on
conversational inference only, we cannot do justice to the intricacies of that distinction here,
and so we are using the term interactional achievement in the broad sense initially outlined by
Schegloff (1981: 73).
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Indeed, as Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue at length, linguistic action confers
on speakers a particular form of commitment. By saying things to others, we are
invariably held to be meaning something – although not necessarily what we’ve
just said – even if we claim to be only talking to ourselves. The level of determi-
nacy that those propositional meanings have and the degree to which speakers
are committed to them will vary depending on the specifics of the linguistic action
and the mutually manifest context in which it occurs. In short, linguistic action
makes available inferences about what the speaker means, and because linguistic
acts are public, the inferences they make available through their utterances are
also public in the sense that speakers will be held committed to what a linguistic
act in a given sequential context is normatively taken to mean (Jary 2013; Sanders
2015). Our contention is that a key mechanism by which the primary propositional
meanings that arise through utterances is settled upon by speakers and hearers is
through subsequent responses to prior utterances.9 In what follows, we focus on
the simpler case of two-person interaction, although the model is extendable to
more complex multi-party interactions.10
An early attempt to clarify the three-part architecture of conversational infer-
ence that underpins speaker meaning was outlined by Haugh (2012: 186–188, 2015:
234–236) drawing, in turn, on Arundale’s (2008, 2010) conjoint co-constituting
model of communication. The three parts (which canonically, but not always,
occur in adjacent turns) go as follows:
1. A produces an utterance u1, making available an inference about how they
expect u1 to be understood;
2. B responds with u2, making available an inference about how they think A
expected u1 to be understood;
3. A responds to B by way of u3, making available an inference about how they
think B has understood how A expected u1 to be understood.
Through this three-part process, the inferences that A and B make available with
regard to a particular utterance u1 become formally tied to one another: both A
and B’s inferences about u1 become interdependent with the inferences that are
9 Readers will note that we are not offering a formal account of propositional meaning here.
This is deliberate as we intend the interactional model outlined in this section to be amenable to
different theoretical accounts of propositional meaning, and so remain agnostic as to which
model of “utterance meaning” might be employed in subsequent theorization.
10 At this point, it should become immediately clear that continuing to refer to “speakers” and
“hearers” will quickly get confusing as the process of negotiating propositional meaning
involves more than one speaker; to avoid such complications we avoid referring to “hearers”
at all, instead making reference to speakers A and B respectively.
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made available by the other participant in the discourse, and the derivation of
meaning is not simply an independent process based on the utterance alone. In
other words, when we speak, we draw inferences about what is meant by
ourselves and others, but these inferences are driven in part by our interlocutors’
inferences about what we mean and vice-versa.
Krippendorff (1970) formally distinguishes (i) an inference at time t, (ii)
whose inference is being made (A or B), and (iii) what the inference is directed
towards (u). On this model, the inference at t2 is dependent on the inference at t1.
While Krippendorff used this notation to describe different types of data, we use
it as a base on which to develop an account that both uses the type of interac-
tional data he advocates, and advance this formalization to model speaker
meaning. Using Krippendorff’s terminology, then, we can formally distinguish
inferences at time t1 and inferences at time t2. A key argument of this paper is to
show that these are not straightforwardly the same thing.
Acknowledging these three variables (utterance u, time t, and whose infer-
ence, A or B) gives us the potential power to represent the meaning of any
utterance at any point in time and as understood by any speaker. Doing so will
highlight when discrepancies in presumed meanings arise between individual
speakers. However, what is needed is a way of identifying the formal depen-
dency between the inferences made by individual speakers on the meanings of
specific utterances. To this end, we take our anchor to be the meaning of a given
utterance u1 which occurs at time t1 (i.e. the time of utterance), such that all
inferences in the model are with regard to this anchor.
We are now in a position to describe our model. Assuming a two-person
interaction, we let A be speaker A’s inference with regard to u1, and B be speaker
B’s inference with regard to u1. When A produces an utterance u1 at t1, A makes
available an inference about the way in which A expects u1 to be understood,
and this inference is made publicly available by way of the content of the
utterance in that sequential context. We call this APb t1ð Þ. It is on the basis of
this publicly available inference that B is able to make a private inference at t1
about what A intended to communicate, which we denote BPv t1ð Þ. So at t1 we
have two sets of inferences: the public inference about what is meant through u1
at t1 that is made available by speaker A through uttering u1, and the private
inference that we (as analysts) presume speaker B makes on the basis of A
uttering u1 at t1 (see Figure 1).
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
Figure 1.
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While Horn (2004) distinguishes “implicatures” – meanings that are speaker
intended – and “inferences” that are hearer interpretations, we do not make
such a distinction and use the term “inference” throughout to highlight the idea
that we are tracing the (presumed) private inferences that people make on the
basis of the inferences that they make publicly available via their utterances.
However, in recognition of the fact that speakers do have (private) beliefs
about the way in which they expect to be understood by their utterances, we add
a previous layer into the model which we describe as the speaker’s private
inference regarding the meaning of u1, denoted APv t0ð Þ (see Figure 2).
11
It is this private inference that can feasibly be equated with a notion of intended
content. But as we cannot get into the heads of speakers this information is for
representational purposes only.12 Rather, the public inference that A makes
available does exactly that: makes available an inference (or set of inferences)
about how A expects to be understood.
By the same token, note that neither A nor the analyst are privy to the
inference BPv t1ð Þ that B privately makes about A’s utterance u1. The analyst can
only make assumptions about what this inference is on the basis of the inference
that B makes available via their reply in u2. So, given B’s presumed inference at
t1, that is, BPv t1ð Þ, B produces an utterance u2 at t2 in response, which makes
available an inference about how B understood A’s initial utterance, u1. The
inference that B makes available is denoted BPb t2ð Þ (see Figure 3).
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
u1
Figure 2.
11 Note that we do not make any claims about the speaker’s cognitive processing regarding this
private inference: one can think of it as constituting the speaker’s a priori intended meaning, or
as a post-hoc inference about his/her own utterance, depending on one’s view on utterance
processing.
12 Regardless of whether speakers are able to engage in a process of mind reading when
gauging another speaker’s intended meaning, it has been suggested that one’s own dominant
perspective is more likely to influence interpretations of what others say (Gregoromichelaki
et al. 2011; Keysar 2007), further justifying an analysis that focuses on speakers’ public
inferences.
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B’s utterance not only makes available an inference about how they expect u2 to
be understood by A, but, crucially, it also makes available an inference about how
B has understood A’s utterance, u1. And note that it is only via this inference that
B makes available at t2 that both the analyst and speaker A can make retro-
spective assumptions about B’s presumed (private) inference at t1 regarding u1.
Now, once B’s inference is made available about u1, it becomes available to
A whether u1 has been understood in the way that A initially expected, and A
can make a private inference about how the meaning of u1 is being operationa-
lized, denoted APv t2ð Þ (see Figure 4).
A’s private inference at t2 about how B has understood u1 may ormay not align with
A’s previous (private) inference at t0 about how he/she expected u1 to be under-
stood. The third turn in the sequence thus provides an opportunity for A to do one of
three things: to (i) repair the mismatch if there is one, (ii) corroborate that B has
satisfactorily understood u1 (either explicitly (e.g. “yes”, “that’s right”), or implicitly
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
BPb(t2)
u1
u2
Figure 3.
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
APv(t2) BPb(t2)
u1
u2
Figure 4.
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by continuing the discourse), or (iii) update their own belief on how u1 has been
understood by accepting the response by B and responding accordingly.
The inference that A privately makes at t2 about the level of convergence
between A and B regarding u1 influences the strategy that A chooses to employ.
A’s response u3 thus makes available an inference to B at t3 about the way A
believes B to have understood u1, APb t3ð Þ, which then leads B to make a private
inference at t3 about A’s initial utterance u1 at t1, BPv t3ð Þ (see Figure 5).
Note that it is possible to conjecture that the inference that A makes available at
t3 via u3 not only concerns how B understood u1 at t2, i.e. the previous turn, but
arguably also tells us something about A’s initial expectation about how A
would be understood at t1. Indeed critically, as analysts, it is only at t3 that we
can make claims about A’s presumed inference at t0 about how u1 would be
understood by B. However, we want to avoid making claims about A’s intention
at t0 on the basis of A’s displayed inference at t3. This is because, in line with A’s
option (iii) above, A can update their belief about the meaning of u1 based on B’s
response at t2. There are various reasons a speaker may do this: for example,
because B’s response was in line with the plausible interpretations A could have
communicated, or because A finds it too trivial or embarrassing to correct, or a
combination of the two.
In order to circumvent the idea that we are making such claims, we avoid
the term “emergent intention” (e.g. Kecskes 2010), as it is not A’s intention that
becomes clear over time, but rather what he/she can legitimately be taken to be
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
APv(t2) BPb(t2)
APb(t3) BPv(t3)
u1
u2
u3
Figure 5.
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meaning. A more accurate way to think about it is thus that people have
intentions that can change over time; that is, the object at which inferences
are taken to be directed, or intentionality more broadly, is dynamic (Haugh
2008b; Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012). That is, whatever A’s initial intention at t0,
B’s response at t2 can lead A to update/revise the meaning they ascribe to u1 . So
rather than referring to “emergent intentions”, we can talk of “emergent mean-
ings”, where meanings are updated as time goes on.
Whatever meaning is made “operative” at tn, where n is the time of some
future turn in the interaction, the representation of that meaning has to be
specified in relation to the process of meaning interaction from time t1, insofar
as the meanings of u1 that emerge over the interaction are formally connected to
future inferences that are made about u1. The model thus distinguishes those
inferences which are tied to a particular utterance u at time t1, and those
inferences which are tied to u at time tn. If we want to represent propositional
meanings, we have to do so with respect to particular times, as those meanings
become cognitively available to participants. And note that in picking out the
propositional meaning at a specific time, we are picking out an inference of a
particular speaker (e.g. A or B) at that time, which may or may not converge with
those of the other participants. In sum, inferences about u at any given time t are
formally connected to prior (t−m) and future (tn) inferences in the sense that
future inferences are dependent on past inferences, and they are all interlinked.
Finally, speakers make inferences about individual utterances u at t1, t2, t3, …,
tn until they converge on a meaning that is sufficient for the purposes of the
discourse. Note that at some point, speakers will not be worrying about the
meanings of prior utterances as it becomes too cognitively demanding to maintain
the process as new turns occur, unless there is a catastrophic miscommunication
which is later called on as the source of trouble. To this end, we leave the exact
value of n open as a matter for psycholinguistics to determine at what point it
becomes cognitively implausible to coordinate on past meanings, although based
on empirical evidence we can conjecture that n typically lies between 3 and 5 as
the number of turns for which it is plausible that the meaning of a “hint” becomes
“determinate enough” that it is adequate for the purposes at hand.
4 Putting the model to work
With the model in place, we are now in a position to exemplify in greater detail
how it can be applied to interactional data, highlighting how the meanings of
critical utterances emerge over time. We begin with a relatively simple example
in which a requestive hint is quickly recognized and confirmed. We then move to
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more complex examples, including a case where the third turn highlights
problems with settling on what the speaker meant by their prior utterance,
and finally an attempt to show how the model can handle cases of indeterminate
meanings.
4.1 A simple example of speaker meaning as interactional
achievement
First, let us recall the example discussed in Section 2.
(1) (Chad is standing in the hallway, holding his 15-month old son’s hand.)
1 C: Hey, Debbie.
2 Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
3 D: Yeah. I think so.
4 You want me to watch him?
5 C: Yeah.
6 D: I’d love to. It’d be a pleasure.
7 C: Okay. Thanks. I’ll bring him around then.
(Jacobs and Jackson 1983: 299)
Note that we can apply the model to any utterance to track the meanings
over time, but for the sake of exemplification, the crucial utterance that we take
as our anchor for this example is Chad’s utterance at line 2, “Are you going to be
free from 1:30 to 2:30?”. This is the utterance that we take as u1 at time t1.
Through u1, Chad makes available his inference about the way he expects u1 to
be understood by Debbie, giving us CPb t1ð Þ. There are a number of options that
can be inferred regarding the content of CPb t1ð Þ, including:
CPb t1ð Þa: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
CPb t1ð Þb: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30 to watch my son?
CPb t1ð Þc: Can you watch my son from 1:30 to 2:30?
Any of these is a plausible candidate that might take on the role of the
primary speaker meaning of u1.
13 But rather than speculate over Chad’s intended
meaning at this point, and in fact regardless of Chad’s actual (private) intention
at t0 regarding how u1 should be understood, the meaning that we are concerned
with is the one that is made operative between these conversational participants.
13 There are, of course, a range of other possible inferences, as we briefly noted in Section 2.
For the sake of expediency, however, we focus on just these three.
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To this end, we turn to Debbie’s inference about u1. Following Chad’s
uttering of u1, Debbie is able to make her own (private) inference DPv t1ð Þ about
Chad’s putative meaning. As a reminder, we only make assumptions about
Debbie’s private inference about u1 on the basis of Debbie’s public utterance
u2 at t2. We see that her initial response, “Yeah. I think so”, attends to the
explicit content of Chad’s question, making available a public inference about
how she has interpreted u1, landing us with a working “speaker meaning” of u1
as pertaining to the literal content of the question, namely:
DPb t2ð Þa: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
However, Debbie’s immediate follow up, “You want me to watch him?”,
makes available her inference that Chad’s utterance u1 may have communicated
an implicit request, namely to watch his son. Thus, Debbie makes available her
inference that Chad’s speaker meaning may have pertained to the enriched
version of the explicit question (i.e. the explicature in Relevance Theoretic
terms), or even the request itself (i.e. the implicature):
DPb t2ð Þb: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30 to watch my son?
DPb t2ð Þc: Can you watch my son from 1:30 to 2:30?
Following Debbie making available her inference about the way that she
understood u1, namely as a request to watch Chad’s son, at t3, Chad accepts
Debbie’s overt invitation in u3 with “Yeah”. It is through this third turn that Chad
makes available his inference that he does, in fact, want Debbie to watch his son,
and hence that Debbie’s inference regarding u1 is compatible with Chad’s overall
communicative goal (cf. Elder Forthcoming). So, Chad’s affirmative response
plays a dual role: first, of accepting Debbie’s offer in u2, but also of confirming
that Debbie’s inference at t2 regarding what Chad meant by uttering u1 was
appropriate. It is only now, following Chad’s u3, that it is reasonable to postulate
that both speakers have jointly converged on the speaker meaning of u1 as:
CPb t3ð Þc: Can you watch my son from 1:30 to 2:30?
Notably, this latter inference arising in the third turn is formally interdependent
with the inferences that were made available through the utterances in the prior
two turns. In short, Chad confirming the inference that he wants Debbie to watch
his son (CPb t3ð Þc) through u3 depends on Debbie making available the inference that
Chad wants Debbie to watch his son (DPb t2ð Þc) through u2, which depends, in turn,
on Chad initially making available the inference that he wants Debbie to watch his
son (CPb t1ð Þc) through u1. This can be formally represented as in Figure 6.
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It is also important to note that even though the interlocutors converged on this
meaning of u1, we still refrain from making claims about Chad’s a priori, pre-
utterance intention at t0 to make a request. Regardless of whether Chad intended
to communicate a request at u1, it is only through the uptake that is made
available at t2 and t3 that we can say with any certainty that this implicit
meaning was made operative between the two interlocutors, that is, that Chad
was taken by both Debbie and himself as implying (or implicating) that he
would like Debbie to watch his son. In other words, while it is plausible that
u1 communicated an implicature of a request, it is by attending to this funda-
mental three-part architecture of conversational inference that we can see how
this aspect of “speaker meaning” is interactionally achieved in communication,
and thus that “speaker meaning” in such cases depends on making available
successive inferences that are formally interdependent with one another.
4.2 Speaker meaning beyond three turns
While participants often readily converge on “speaker meaning” in the man-
ner described above, in some instances such meanings may be worked out
over a number of turns that go beyond this basic three-part architecture.
While such cases are traditionally treated as instances of “miscommunica-
tion” in need of repair by the participants and so are held to lie outside the
purview of a theoretical account of “speaker meaning”, closer examination of
such cases indicates that the negotiation of “speaker meaning” may arise for
a number of reasons that go beyond either straightforward “misunderstand-
ings” of the speaker’s putative intentions, or processing errors on the part of
one or both of the participants, as we briefly noted in examining cases of
hinting in Section 2.
CPv(t )
CPb(t ) DPv(t )
CPv(t ) DPb(t )
CPb(t ) DPv(t )
u2: you want me to watch him? 
u1: are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
u3: yeah.
Figure 6.
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For a start, although it may sound somewhat oxymoronic, speakers do not
necessarily always have determinate intentions in mind when they speak, at
least, regarding the precise propositional content that they are communicating.
They may speak in ways that leave room for the other speaker to determine what
they are taken to mean (Elder Forthcoming; Jaszczolt et al. 2016). Speakers may
also be opportunistic with respect to what they are taken to be meaning,
responding to local contingencies (Haugh 2007), or they may even change
their minds, allowing what the other speaker understands them to have meant
to stand as it turns out to suit them (Clark 1997). They may also subsequently
dispute what they are taken to mean when they are understood in a way that
turns out to have significant negative (real-world) consequences for them
(Haugh 2008a). For our purposes, we contend that such instances have signifi-
cant theoretical import as they attest to the way in which participants draw from
the three-part architecture of conversational inference despite this negotiation
occurring over successive turns.
In the following example, for instance, we can trace the way in which the
meaning of an utterance is subject to subtle negotiation by the two participants.
Mike (MH), a researcher, is visiting Mary (MP), his old music teacher.
(4) (Mary has offered Mike some biscuits and both have started eating them)
1 MP: ((while eating)) oh.
2 MH: [mm
3 MP: [I haven’t gotta y’a bread ’n butter plate
4 but there’s one in the cupboard if you want one.
5 MH: mm, oh should be okay.
6 I’ll j[u-
7 MP: [yo[u alright?
8 MH: [d’ya d’ya
9 do you want one?
10 MP: um yea- well it’s le- less messier actually.
11 MH: okay.
12 MP: um, on the bottom shelf,
13 MH: mhm.
14 MP: just above the stove.
(Haugh 2015: 192)14
14 For the sake of expediency, the original transcription has been simplified, apart from the
representation of overlapping talk, indicated by square brackets, and cut-off words, indicated
by dashes. See Haugh (2015: 191–197) for a more detailed transcription and analysis of this
example.
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As we noted before, we can apply the model to any utterance in a given
example, but the critical utterance that we take as our anchor for analysis here is
Mary’s utterance in lines 3–4, “I haven’t got you a bread and butter plate but
there’s one in the cupboard if you want one”. This is the utterance that we take
as u1 at time t1.
Through u1, Mary makes available her inference about the way she expects
u1 to be understood by Mike, giving us MPPb t1ð Þ. However, there are a number of
options that can be inferred regarding the content of MPPb t1ð Þ, as while Mary
makes available an inference at t1, which at first glance appears to be a condi-
tional offer with Mike as the beneficiary, it could also be understood as a (polite)
request with Mary or Mike as the beneficiary, or even a request with both Mary
and Mike as beneficiaries:
MPPb t1ð Þa: You can get a bread and butter plate from the cupboard if you
want one
MPPb t1ð Þb: I want you to get a bread and butter plate from the cupboard for
you
MPPb t1ð Þc: I want you to get a bread and butter plate from the cupboard for me
MPPb t1ð Þd: I want you to get a bread and butter plate for both of us
As in the previous example, any of these is a plausible candidate that might
take on the role of the primary speaker meaning of u1. But rather than speculate
over Mary’s intended meaning at this point, and in fact regardless of Mary’s
actual intention regarding how u1 should be understood, the meaning that we
are concerned with is the one that these conversational participants ultimately
settle upon in the fifth turn, namely, that Mary is asking Mike to go and get
bread and butter plates for them both ðMPPb t5ð ÞdÞ. Notably, settling on this
inference as what u1 comes to mean takes more than three turns. In order to
account for why this happens we must first trace the inferences leading up to
those made available through Mary’s utterance in the third turn, and then what
subsequently follows.
Starting with Mary’s u1 at time t1 in lines 3–4, we can presume that Mike
makes some kind of inference (MHPv t1ð Þ) about what Mary means on the basis of
that utterance. Through his response u2 at t2 in lines 5–6 he makes available the
inference that he is refusing her offer, which is predicated on the inference that
through her prior utterance she was making an offer to him (MHPb t2ð Þa). Mary
then presumably makes an inference on the basis of Mike’s response (MPPv t2ð Þ),
the exact content of which is unknowable to us. However, the public inference
she makes available through her subsequent response in line 7, u3 at t3, is that
she was not necessarily simply making an offer with Mike as the beneficiary
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(MPPb t3ð Þ:a). This inference is made available partly through the content of
Mary’s utterance itself, as asking “you alright?” presupposes that Mike may be
experiencing some kind of trouble, and partly because it is evidently interruptive
of Mike’s just prior response, u2 at t2, as we can see from the overlapping talk at
this point, and Mike’s consequent abandonment of whatever he was going to go
on to say in line 6.
Our contention is that in Mary’s making available the inference that Mike’s
response u2 to her initial utterance u1 was in some respects inapposite, that is, by
Mary not straightforwardly confirming that what she meant by u1 was that she
was making an offer with Mike as the beneficiary, she launches a second round
of three-part conversational inferencing within which the prior three interlinked
inferences are embedded. In other words, Mary’s question in line 7 (u3 at t3) is
Janus-faced (Arundale and Good 2002) as it both retrospectively disconfirms
Mike’s inference that Mary was making a straightforward offer with Mike as
the beneficiary (i.e. MPPb t3ð Þ:a) but also prospectively prompts Mike to draw a
different inference with respect to the getting of plates, and thus to what she
meant by u1. The public inference that is made available through u3 at t3 can
thus be simultaneously represented in this model as MPPb t3ð Þ:a and MPPb t3ð Þb˄c˄d,
where the latter representation denotes possible inferences that remain available
to Mike.
However, if we continue to treat Mary’s utterance in lines 3–4 as our anchor
(i.e. u1) – an analytical move that is arguably warranted given the orientation of
the participants themselves to the issue of getting plates as not having been
settled at this point – then we can see that Mike’s subsequent response in lines
8–9 (u4 at t4), which is initially delivered in overlap and thus is interruptive of
Mary’s just prior question in line 7 (u3 at t3), makes available the inference that
Mike is making an offer with Mary as the beneficiary, thereby retrospectively
treating, and thus making available, the inference that Mary is implicating a
request with Mary as the beneficiary (MHPb t4ð Þc), as opposed to a request with
Mike as the beneficiary (MHPb t4ð Þ:b).
Once again, however, Mary’s response to Mike’s offer, u5 at t5 in line 10,
makes available the inference that Mike’s response is still somehow inapposite
(i.e. MPPb t5ð Þ:c). While she initially responds in a way that appears as if she is
going to straightforwardly accept the offer (“um yea-”), her confirming response
is cut-off and redone with an account (“well it’s less messier actually”). Through
this account Mary makes available the inference that eating off plates would be
better, and thus that she is making a request with both Mary and Mike as
beneficiaries (MPPb t5ð Þd). Mike indicates his understanding of Mary’s overall
communicative intention through both his verbal response (“okay” in line 11,
u6 at t6) and non-verbal actions (i.e. getting a plate for both of them while Mary
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instructs him on where the plates are kept in lines 12–14), thereby making
available his final inference vis-à-vis u1, and the one they both settle on,
MHPb t6ð Þd.
To summarize, the conversational inferences that underpin the interactional
achievement of this “speaker meaning” can be represented as in Figure 7.
Note that the exact relationship between the public inference that Mary makes
available at t5 (i.e. MPPb t5ð Þd) which they ultimately settle upon at t6 (i.e.
MHPb t6ð Þd), and the one that Mary initially makes available (MPPb t1ð Þa˄b˄c˄d) at t1
is clearly open to dispute by these two conversational participants. It is possible
that Mike did respond in the way that Mary consciously intended, namely as an
offer of a plate, but something about the situation of discourse (e.g. that Mike
was making a lot of mess when eating the biscuits) prompted Mary to respond in
such a way so as to indicate something was wrong, and so she formed a post hoc
intention to get Mike to eat the biscuits from a plate. However, it is also possible
that Mary did intend Mike to get plates for them both all along, and that the
negotiation of settling on the speaker meaning of u1 was all in service of that
initial intention.
Pv(t )
Pb(t )a∧b∧c∧d Pv(t )
Pv(t ) Pb(t )a
Pb(t )¬a∧b∧c∧d Pv(t )
Pv(t ) Pb(t )¬b∧c
Pb(t )¬c∧d Pv(t )
Pv(t ) Pb(t )d
u1: there’s one in the cupboard if you want one 
u2: should be okay
u4: do you want one?
u3: you alright?
u5: it’s less messier
u6: okay
MP
MP
MP
MP
MP
MP
MP
MH
MH
MH
MH
MH
MH
Figure 7.
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What we can say with certainty is that we cannot say with any certainty
that the final meaning that is settled on as the “speaker meaning” is the one
that Mary intended at t0; instead, it is more empirically sound to suggest that
since Mike responded in a particular way, Mary decided to continue the
discourse in accordance with Mike’s response. In this sense, we cannot attri-
bute an a priori intention to Mary at t0, as intentions can change over time, and
hence may be ascribed to utterances in different ways at different times.
Presuming a particular intention of Mary at t0, and deciding whether Mike
got it “right” (or not), is therefore not a cognitively or empirically accurate way
to analyse her utterance meaning, exactly because through making responses
to her prior talk, Mike influences the inferences that Mary subsequently makes
available, and vice versa. It is for this reason that Haugh (2017b) proposes that
“prompting” is a more appropriate term for this kind of phenomenon, as to
treat it as “hinting” presumes a definitive, a priori intention on the part of Mary
at t0.
15 However, while Mary could retrospectively be taken by Mike as inten-
tionally hinting at t1, he (and we) can never be sure. What we can say for sure
is that whatever her intentions might have been, the “speaker meaning” that
the two participants make operative is the one that they ultimately interaction-
ally achieve over a series of interlinked turns of talk. So, then, in terms of
propositional meaning, it doesn’t really matter what Mary intended, but rather
that at t3 she makes it clear whether Mike displayed an inference that was
compatible with what she plausibly could have intended (Elder Forthcoming;
Sanders 2015).
What should be clear from this interlinked set of representations is that
these inferences are formally interdependent. That is, the public inference that
Mary settles on (MPPb t5ð Þd) is made available in response to the prior inference
made available by Mike (MHPb t4ð Þ:b˄c), which is made available, in turn, in
response to the prior inference made available by Mary (MPPb t3ð Þ:a˄b˄c˄d),
which is made available in response to the prior inference made available
by Mike (MHPb t2ð Þa), which is made available, in turn, in response to the infer-
ence initially made available by Mary (MPPb t1ð Þa˄b˄c˄d) at time t1. In other words,
the latter inferences recursively embed sequentially prior ones, and so are
formally interdependent with them. It is the formal interdependence of this
underlying three-part architecture of conversational inference that confers the
property of non-additivity on the interactional achievement of “speaker
meaning”.
15 Conversational participants may well attempt, of course, to hold a speaker accountable for
having such “intentions”.
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4.3 Indeterminate meanings
The focus on adjacent turns of talk in our analysis thus far may give rise to the
impression that we are privileging the local sequential context over the influence
of broader contextual considerations in developing a formal model of “speaker
meaning” as interactional achievement. However, while conversational partici-
pants may very often settle on what a speaker is taken to mean by an utterance u
at time t through adjacent turns of talk, this is not always the case, as the three-
part architecture of conversational inference may well be dispersed across a
number of non-adjacent turns. More importantly, perhaps, what a speaker is
taken to mean by an utterance u at time t may well be influenced by utterances
that have occurred well before the one in question (u−m at time t−m) or well after
it (un at time tn) (Haugh 2012). Indeed, even when participants converge through
the three-part architecture of conversational inference on a particular “meaning”
with respect to a particular utterance that is initially indeterminate as to what
exactly is meant by that speaker, there may nevertheless remain some degree of
indeterminacy for those participants with respect to what the speaker is taken to
have meant.
To illustrate what we mean by this claim, consider the following example.
(5) (Emma and Chris are talking about how acupuncture draws on the notion
of chi)
1 E: and the needles happen to be one of the most effective
2 ways to manipulate it
3 C: yeah?
4 E: mmmm
5 C: can you fix patellar tendonitis? °heh°
6 (1.7)
7 E: ↑maybe ↑yeah
8 C: yeah?
9 (0.3)
10 E: have you got that?
11 C: I have yeah
(Haugh 2008b: 63)16
16 Once again, the original transcription has been simplified apart from representing softly
delivered speech, indicated through degree symbols, rising intonation, indicated through
arrows and question marks, and pauses, indicated through reporting the length of silence
between utterances measured to the nearest tenth of a second in brackets. See Haugh (2015:
219–224) for a more detailed transcription and analysis of this example.
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What is meant by Chris’s utterance u1 in line 5, “can you fix patellar
tendonitis?”, appears at first glance to be genuinely indeterminate. Some of
the possible inferences that he makes available include:
CPb t1ð Þa: I want to know if you can fix patellar tendonitis
CPb t1ð Þb: I want to know if you can fix my patellar tendonitis
CPb t1ð Þc: I want you to fix my patellar tendonitis
CPb t1ð Þd: I doubt you can fix patellar tendonitis
While the first three possible inferences made available through Chris’
utterance u1 at time t1 are clearly interlinked, the fourth introduces a playful,
non-serious frame, and (normatively) requires a very different sort of response to
that expected to the former three. This indeterminacy as to what Chris means by
his question is partly a function of the way in which his question appears to
come somewhat out of the blue, as previously Emma has been talking in only
very general terms about how acupuncture works. Indeed, Emma only responds
after a considerable pause (line 6). It is also a consequence of the way in which a
(soft) pulse of laughter is appended to his question in turn-final position. Turn-
final laughter can invite laughter (Jefferson 1979), which would frame Chris’
question as a teasing challenge. Laughter can also orient to the action delivered
through that turn as potentially disaffiliative or offensive (Clift 2012), in this
case, raising the possibility that fixing this particular medical condition lies
beyond what can be achieved through acupuncture. After a pause, however,
Emma orients to Chris’s question as potentially pre-request implicative, that is,
as likely projecting a forthcoming request for treatment by Chris for that condi-
tion, and the conversation proceeds on those grounds.
Note, however, that Emma responds to Chris’ question in such a way as to
avoid being committed to an interpretation of it as a pre-request. By only first
responding with “maybe, yeah” in line 7, Emma makes available the inference
that she has understood Chris as asking whether she is able to treat patellar
tendonitis (EPb t2ð Þa). She thereby withholds a pre-emptive offer that would make
available the inference that she has understood Chris as implying that he would
like her assistance to treat patellar tendonitis (his or someone else’s for whom he
is asking). Chris then responds in a way in line 8 that makes available and thus
confirms the former inference (i.e. CPb t3ð Þa) but remains indeterminate with
respect to the latter two inferences (i.e. CPb t1ð Þb or CPb t1ð Þc). Emma’s subsequent
question (“have you got that?”) then makes available this second inference
(EPb t4ð Þb), an inference that Chris subsequently confirms (“I have yeah”). In
that way, then, Emma treats Chris’s question as only potentially pre-request
implicative, but not necessarily so. Indeed, it is only many turns later that
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Chris finally asks for Emma’s card, thereby confirming this inference (see Haugh
2012: 181–182).
(6) (Emma and Chris have been discussing Chris’ condition for over a minute)
1 E: I don’t know if I could get a lasting result
2 I don’t know if I could cure it but I could
3 [certainly] probably improve it
4 C: [yeah ]
5 C: yeah, your card [or ah ]
6 E: [yeah I’ll] give ya a card
7 C: yeah
8 E: I’m give ya a card [now]
9 C: [will ]ing to give anything a go
(Haugh 2012: 181)
The initial three-part model can thus be extended m-turns preceding or, in
this case, n-turns following the utterance that serves as the anchor for the focal
“speaker meaning” in question (see Figure 8).
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
APv(t2) BPb(t2)
APb(t3) · · ·
APv(tn) BPb(tn)
· · ·
u1: can you fix patellar tendonitis?
u3: yeah?
u2: maybe, yeah
un: yeah, your card
Figure 8.
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In sum, despite initial indeterminacy as to what is meant by Chris’s question
in line 5, Emma and Chris nevertheless move towards interactionally achieving
over time an operative understanding of Chris’s “speaker meaning” here as
implicating a forthcoming request for a medical consultation about that condi-
tion. Just as we saw in the case of the negotiation of what Mary initially meant in
the previous example, initial indeterminacy with respect to “speaker meaning”
can be resolved through the three-part architecture of conversational inference
ratcheting down as the conversation progresses.
There therefore appear to be formal grounds for the claim by interactional linguists that
meaning lies not with the speaker nor the addressee nor the utterance alone as many
philosophical arguments have considered, but rather with the interactional past, current,
and projected next moment. The meaning of an entire utterance is a complex, not well
understood, algorithm of these emergent, non-linear, sense-making interactions. (Schegloff
et al. 1996: 181).
We have attempted here to formally model the conversational inferences
that underpin this algorithm, and in so doing, would submit that while complex,
such emergent, non-linear inferential processes are nevertheless tractable—as
indeed they must ultimately be, given we do evidently understand each other
sufficiently for us to manage the current conversational purposes at hand (at
least most of the time).
It is important to note though that whatever “speaker meaning” is ultimately
interactionally achieved by the participants through that three-part architecture,
other inferences that are initially made available by that utterance are not
necessarily eliminated (Haugh 2017a). Whether Emma also took Chris’s question
as a teasing challenge remains off-record but nevertheless inferable, given the
specific design and sequential placement of his question, and the scepticism
about acupuncture that Chris had previously expressed in that conversation (see
Haugh 2012: 182–184). While off-record inferences of the latter sort may well
arise, they are by their very nature generally left off-record by conversational
participants. It is for that reason that we are limiting, for the moment at least,
our account of “speaker meaning” to primary propositional meanings that are
made operative between interlocutors.
5 Conclusion
A key question for any theory of meaning concerns the kind of meaning that is to
be represented, whether that is explicit meanings pertaining to uttered sentence
forms, or whether it is the most salient meanings that are (sometimes implicitly)
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communicated by interlocutors. Our aim has been to represent the meanings that
interlocutors jointly and manifestly make use of in interaction, and hence to
develop a model of speaker meaning that formalizes non-additive aspects of
speaker meaning that can output determinate propositional forms. While our
account gives credence to the idea that an implicitly communicated implicature
is sometimes the most salient meaning that is understood by interlocutors, it also
shows that the main intended meaning of the speaker may not be the one that is
picked up on. Rather, our account provides a fine-grained account of the formal
interdependence of the conversational inferencing that interlocutors engage in
when mutually operationalizing meanings for current purposes. Our account there-
fore enables us to identify when and where mismatches in understandings
between speakers occur, but also to track the resolution of understandings that
may lead to meanings that weren’t “intended” at the time of utterance.
One of the key aims of this paper has thus been to extend the one- or two-
turn accounts of speaker meaning that are prevalent in the extant literature to
consider the – sometimes crucial – third turn that influences the uptake of
meaning. Of course, prototypically, speakers do not have problems working
out inferences of utterances in real time. It would be costly and arduous for
speakers to continually confirm in the third turn that they have been understood
satisfactorily, and speakers generally opt instead to simply continue the dis-
course. In that sense, the three-turn process can be – and is very often – short-
circuited, as two turns is enough to mutually presume understanding. However,
we have to understand that the one- or two-turn additive inferential process is a
short-circuiting of a more complex non-additive process, by which non-additive
inferences emerge through the three-part architecture that we have modelled
here. But it is exactly because these formally non-additive inferences consist of
interdependently linked chains of additive inferences that the process can be
straightforwardly short-circuited by conversational participants.
There are nevertheless aspects of speaker meaning that we have not addressed
in this model. Speaker meaning itself is a heterogenous class (Sperber and Wilson
2015) of which primary propositional meanings are just one type, and (as
Relevance Theorists have long argued) a range of weak implicatures may also
arise in communicative interaction. We suggest that the latter types of “secondary
meanings” are inevitably premised on additive conversational inferences, which,
on the formal grounds we have outlined here, cannot be “confirmed” by partici-
pants in the way that primary propositional meanings can. Moreover, side parti-
cipants or over-hearers to conversation are totally reliant on a short-circuited two-
stage process as they do not provide contributions by which they can make
available their inferences with respect to what is being said, and so their under-
standings of speaker meanings are formally summative or additive. We have thus
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only offered here a partial account of a broader notion of pragmatic meaning that
includes not only speaker meanings, but other sorts of recipient meanings as well
(Culpeper and Haugh 2014).
Finally, while tracing the inferences that conversational participants make
available through their responses to (just) prior turns of talk offers analysts a
very useful tool for tracing the emergence of speaker meanings in discourse, it
does not eliminate the need for other kinds of methods that allow us to tap into
the private inferences that conversational participants evidently make. Our
model is thus not intended to override extant accounts of meaning, and we
have deliberately remained agnostic about the specifics of cognitive processing
to be filled by other theories of utterance processing. Rather, our point has been
that while it is possible to go from a three-part account of conversational
inference (as we have proposed here) to theorising about a one- or two-stage
process, the reverse is not formally possible: speaker meanings that arise
through the three-part architecture of conversational inferencing cannot be
reduced without remainder to those arising through one or two parts.
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